Better known is a later statement by Justice Louis Brandeis, who wrote in that There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experiinentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs "For an excellent and recent review of this whole debate in a historical context, see Therese McGuire There are thus important informational and political constraints that are likely to prevent central programs from generating an optimal pattern of local outputs.
There seem to be some basic efficiency- enhancing aspects of interjurisdictional competition, but there are clearly a range of "imperfections" that can be the source of allocative distortions.
The approach of Inman and Rubinfeld a,b,c incorporates explicitly certain political goals into a more extended objective function. And a federal system may offer some real opportuni- ties for encouraging such experimenta- tion and thereby promoting "technical progress" in public policy.
A little reflection suggests first that there is nothing in principle to prevent the central government from undertaking limited experiments without committing the nation to an untested and risky policy measure.
The third potential role for intergov- ernmental grants is to sustain a more equitable and efficient overall tax sys- tem. In the United Kingdom, both Scot- land and Wales have opted under the Blair government for their own regional parliaments.
In such a setting, governments compete with one another for a mobile capital stock that both generates income for local residents and provides a tax base for them-and such competi- tion leads local officials to adopt effi- cient levels of outputs of public goods and tax rates.
An unconditional grant is usually a cash or tax point transfer, with no spending instructions. I then turn to some of the new directions in recent work in the field and explore a series of current top- ics: Or they can be "unconditional," that is, source-based taxes or "origin taxes" involve tax- ing factors where the are employed and goods and services where tBey are purchasecl Under resident-based taxation, governments have much less capacity to export the incidence of their taxes onto economic units elsewhere.
The analysis of "re ulatory federalism" is, in principle, analogous to t 5at of fiscal federal- ism. However, the models that generate these results are nothing of the sort.
The net outcome on the amount of experimentation is thus a priori unclear. I11 a setting of imperfect information with learning-by-doing, there are poten- tial gains from experimentation with a variety of policies for addressing social and economic problems.
It is then straightforward to show that they will set excessively lax environmental standards in order to en- courage a larger inflow of capital so as to enlarge the local tax base Oates and Schwab As a result, observers outside the U.
On this, see Charles Brown and Oates In a setting of perfect infor- mation, it would obviously be possible for a benevolent central planner to pre- scribe the set of differentiated local outputs that maximizes overall social welfare; there would be no need for fiscal decentralization although one might wish to describe such an outcome as decentralized in spirit!
High excise taxes in one jurisdiction, for ex- ample, may lead purchasers to bear un- productive travel costs in order to pur- chase the taxed items in jurisdictions with lower tax rates. Their claim is that the mobility of workers across state borders undoes efforts at redistribution-and does so very quickly.
Federal governments use this power to enforce national rules and standards. If the lower level of government is to receive this type of transfer, it must agree to the spending instructions of the federal government.
The fascinating study by Bruce Ackerman et al. But ""he Rose-Ackerinan and Strum f analyses, incidentally, also produce a number o! A conditional transfer from a federal body to a province, or other territory, involves a certain set of conditions. From this perspective, Barry WeingastRonald McKinnon aand their colleagues have explored the insti- tutional structure of a system that prom- ises to provide a stable framework for a market system see also McKinnon and Nechyba and Qian and Weingast David Wildasin a provides a valu- able survey of the various im lications of factor mobilit both for economic eflciency and for the redistriiutive impact of public policy.
To maximize overall social welfare thus requires that local outputs vary accordingly. Osborne It is my sense that this is the primary thrust behind the current welfare reform. The basic political objectives thus strengthen the case for increased decentralization; they point to a system that is more decentralized than one chosen simply on the grounds of an exercise in economic optimization.
Susan Rose-Ackerman and, more recently, Strumpf have taken two quite different formal approaches to policy innovation in a federal system. In such settings, we find that outcomes can easily occur that involve suboptimal levels of public outputs. First, one can realistically introduce some basic imperfections or asymmetries in information.
Likewise, the recognition that the man- agement of ground-level ozone involves pollutants that travel long distances across the midwestern and northeastern parts of the United States has led, un- der congressional legislation into the formation of an Ozone Transport Region OTR for the coordination of efforts to manage air quality in eleven eastern states and the District of Co- lumbia.
Or, more accurately, the analysis shows that on efficiency grounds decentralized governments should tax mobile economic units with benefit levies Oates and Robert Schwab ; Oates b. There exists a basic "information externality" in that states that adopt new and experimental policies generate valuable information for others.
More generally, in a careful study of the intergovernmental grant system, Inman concludes that the economic the- ory of intergovernmental grants does not provide a very satisfactory explana- tion of the structure of U.
It turns out that it is straightforward to develop an analogue to perfect competition in the private sector. But a society may well wish, for other reasons, to provide additional sup- port for the provision of local public services such as schools in relatively low-income areas e.
This is to be expected.
In the absence of monetary and exchange-rate prerogatives and with highly open economies that cannot contain much of the expansionary impact of fiscal stim- uli, provincial, state, and local govern- ments simply have very limited means for traditional macroeconomic control of their economies.
The case re- mains strong, it seems to me, for leav- ing "local matters in local hands. This principle has been formally adopted as part of the Maastrict Treaty for European Union.Oates: An Essay on Fiscal Federalism An Essay on Fiscal Federalism WALLACE E.
OATES1 1. Introduction F ISCAL DECENTRALIZATION is in world, we likewise see widespread inter- (September ) some further analysis, for providing. The Basic Theory of Fiscal * Federalism: Some Comments The traditional theory of fiscal feder- alism lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of func- tions to different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out.
This paper is a selective survey of fiscal federalism. It begins with a brief review and some reflections on the traditional theory of fiscal federalism: the assignment of functions to levels of government, the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization, and the use of fiscal instruments.
For example, in the classical federalism model, government's main role is to provide public goods (Tiebout ; Oates ), while in fiscal federalism, the main role of government is preserving the market (Weingast ).
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An Essay on Fiscal Federalism by Wallace E. Oates. Published in volume 37, issue 3, pages of Journal of Economic Literature, SeptemberAbstract: This.Download